This paper investigates factors that explain the large variability in the price of voluntary carbon offsets. We estimate hedonic price functions using a variety of provider-and project-level characteristics as explanatory variables. We find that providers located in Europe sell offsets at prices that are approximately 30 percent higher than providers located in either North America or Australasia. Contrary to what one might expect, offset prices are generally higher, by roughly 20 percent, when projects are located in developing or least-developed nations. But this result does not hold for forestry-based projects. We find evidence that forestry-based offsets sell at lower prices, and the result is particularly strong when projects are located in developing or least-developed nations. Offsets that are certified under the Clean Development Mechanism or the Gold Standard, and therefore qualify for emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol, sell at a premium of more than 30 percent; however, third-party certification from the Voluntary Carbon Standard, one of the largest certifiers, is associated with a price discount. Variables that have no effect on offset prices are the number of projects that a provider manages and a provider's status as forprofit or not-for-profit.
Introduction
There is widespread agreement on the need to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to mitigate the effects of global climate change, and attention is now focused on setting emission targets and designing policies to help achieve them. The unique and difficult challenges associated with the design and implementation of GHG policies are well-known and have given rise to a substantial academic literature (see, for example, Aldy and Stavins 2007) . Among the significant challenges that must be overcome are concerns about the high costs of compliance and distributional equity. In response to these concerns, nearly all GHG policies-regardless of whether they are implemented at the regional, national, or international level-allow offsets to count toward emission reductions.
Offsets are based on the idea that agents need not reduce their own emissions in order to reduce the amount of GHGs in the atmosphere; instead, they can pay someone else to reduce emissions and achieve the same effect on atmospheric concentrations. Agents prefer offsets, of course, if the payment required is less than their own abatement costs. Offsets work in principle because GHGs are uniformly distributed pollutants in the global atmosphere, and the location of emissions (or reductions) has no effect on the impact of climate change. Only the net effect on overall GHG emissions is what matters. Typically, offsets arise through investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, reforestation, or other projects that reduce emissions or sequester GHGs. Though usually referred to as "carbon offsets," many projects focus on other GHGs, such as projects based on biomass and industrial methane capture, and emission reductions are measured in carbon dioxide equivalent units (CO 2 e).
Carbon offsets provide the basis for two of the Kyoto Protocol's primary mechanisms for reducing GHG emissions in the context of an international environmental agreement. Under Joint Implementation (JI), industrialized nations can purchase carbon credits (effectively offsets) from emission-reducing projects located in other industrialized nations or nations with transition economies.
1 Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), industrialized countries can purchase offsets in much the same way, though CDM credits are acquired through the finance of projects in developing nations. 2 Questions about offsets are also playing a pivotal role in determining the future of the Waxman-Markey bill, which sets emissions targets and seeks to establish a national cap-and-trade program in the United States. Recent drafts of the legislation allow businesses to offset up to 30 or 63 percent of their emissions.
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Beyond the regulatory setting, efforts to reduce GHG emissions are also being undertaken around the globe voluntarily. It is increasingly common for businesses, organizations, and individuals to voluntarily purchase carbon offsets. According to Hamilton et al. (2009) range from the development of strategies for corporate environmental management, the pursuit of public relations or reputation benefits, and even the desire for guilt alleviation (see Kotchen 2009a Kotchen , 2009b . But along with the increased popularity of voluntary offsets have come calls for more oversight of the market. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has be-gun investigating concerns about the market and whether there is a need for greater consumer protection.
In both regulatory and voluntary settings, offsets generate controversy. Despite the cost savings, there are those who object in principle to the idea of paying someone else to reduce emissions, rather than doing it oneself. More pragmatic concerns tend to focus on whether carbon offsets are additional, permanent, and credible. Offsets are additional only if the project reduces emissions relative to an established baseline level of emissions, typically meaning that the reductions would not have occurred without the offset payment. Though the idea of establishing additionality is simple in theory, the practice of determining baseline trends against which to compare offset projects is a challenging problem without clear guidelines. There are also concerns about the permanence of emission reductions or sequestration, particularly when it comes to forestry-based offsets, which are subject to future uncertainty about land use, forest health, and the risk of fire. These issues have led some to argue that the price of forestry-based offsets should be discounted to reflect the inherent uncertainty of such projects (Pfaff et al. 2000; Kim, McCarl and Murray 2008) . Further issues arise because of asymmetric information. Offset providers know a lot about the projects in which they invest, but offset buyers know only what the providers tell them. The asymmetry gives rise to a standard source of market failure. Consequently, many third-party organizations have emerged to set standards, audit projects, and verify whether offset providers are delivering on the quality and quantity of their claims.
The present paper seeks to further the understanding of underlying patterns in the market for voluntary carbon offsets. We focus on a fundamental question: What explains the price of voluntary carbon offsets? The rationale for carbon offsets is that they provide a mechanism to reduce GHG emissions at a lower cost. Moreover, because a unit of GHG reductions has the same effect regardless of where and how it takes place, at least from the perspective of climate change, one might expect the market to converge to the law of one price. But, as we will show, the price of carbon offsets is highly variable. One explanation for the price variability is that carbon off-sets are impure public goods, meaning that they contain both private and public characteristics that may affect supply and demand (Kotchen 2006) . For instance, people may be inclined to purchase carbon offsets because of co-benefits associated with poverty alleviation or biodiversity conservation, giving rise to offsets sometimes referred to as "charismatic carbon."
To help explain the variability in offset prices, we estimate hedonic price functions that focus on characteristics of offset providers and offset projects themselves. Characteristics of the offset providers that we consider include geographic location, status as for-profit or not-forprofit, and size in terms of the number of projects being managed. Detailed data on specific offset projects include the nation in which the project is located, different types of third-party certification, and the mechanism by which the project reduces emissions (wind, solar, biomass, forestry, etc.). Our primary source of data is the Carbon Catalog (CC), which is an online directory that provides detailed information on carbon offset providers and projects worldwide. The complete dataset consists of information on 97 offset providers and 280 offset projects.
By identifying key determinants of carbon offset prices, this paper will inform continuing debate about the appropriate role of offsets in a regulatory context, as well as ongoing controversy in the voluntary market. Some of the main findings of our econometric analysis include the following: Providers located in Europe sell offsets at prices that are approximately 30 percent higher than providers located elsewhere. Contrary to what one might expect, offset prices are higher, by roughly 20 percent, when projects are located in developing or least-developed nations. We find evidence that forestry-based offsets sell at lower prices, and the result is particularly strong when the projects are located in developing or least-developed nations. Offsets that are certified to qualify under the Kyoto Protocol sell at a premium of more than 30 percent, while third-party certification from the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS), one of the largest certifiers, is associated with a price discount of nearly 25 percent.
In the next section, we describe the data used in our analysis and report descriptive statistics that characterize the market for carbon offsets. Section 3 describes our empirical methods and the results of our econometric analysis at both the provider-and project-level. We then discuss, in Section 4, a range of possible explanations for the empirical findings, along with more general policy implications. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main results and concludes.
Data
The Carbon Catalog (CC) is our primary source of data. CC is a publicly-available, online directory that provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date information on carbon offset providers and projects worldwide. 4 CC is a freely available service that does not sell carbon offsets and whose mission is to simply increase transparency in the market. Our dataset includes all provid- The upper-right panel of Figure 3 illustrates the breakdown of project type in terms of the mechanism whereby CO 2 e emissions are offset. Projects associated with reforestation, and possibly avoided deforestation, are most common, comprising 34 percent of all offset projects. Other categories with a substantial number of projects are biomass methane capture (16%), wind generated electricity (14%), and industrial methane capture (9%). All other types comprise near or below five percent of all projects. In the order of prevalence, the categories include projects based on fuel efficiency, hydropower, fuel substitution, solar power, efficient lighting, environmental building, material substitution, public transportation, geothermal power, and heat electricity cogeneration. A final category, referred to as market-based, does not have a specified type because it is based on created markets in which offsets are bought and sold from projects of various types. Only a small number of observations fall in this last category and include emission allowances from the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (GGAS), and European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System (EU ETS).
The final panel in Figure 3 illustrates data on selected third-party certification of offset projects. CC considers only three types of certification: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the Gold Standard (GS), and the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS). CDM projects are those that qualify as part of the Kyoto Protocol as satisfying criteria so that industrialized nations can receive credit for emission reductions through the finance of offset projects in developing nations. The GS certification goes above and beyond the CDM in setting high-end offset criteria that promote sustainable development and focus on renewable energy and energy efficiency. The VCS is an independent classification standard that aims to set a quality threshold for the purpose of standardizing and stimulating innovation in the voluntary offset market. The CDM, GS, and VCS certifications account for twelve, two, and eight percent of the projects in the dataset.
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While 80 percent of the projects in the dataset are not certified by any of these three systems, we do not know whether they are completely uncertified or certified by some other standard. As reviewed by Hamilton et al. (2009) , there are several other certification standards, but the three considered by CC are the most common.
In addition to the variables described above, we sought to incorporate several other provider-and project-level attributes into our analysis. At the provider-level, we have data on the self-reported efficiency of the operation, which records the percentage of the price that goes to fund the offset-producing project. At the project level, we have data on both the size of the project, in terms of the quantity of GHGs offset, and the time horizon over which the project would operate. The additional variables described in this paragraph, however, are based on data of questionable quality and/or are only available for a subset of the providers and projects in the overall data set. For these reasons, and because we never found meaningful results based on these variables, we do not include them in the results reported here.
Methods and Results
The primary objective of our empirical analysis is to determine which variables explain variability in the price of carbon offsets. We estimate hedonic price functions at two different levels of data aggregation. We begin at the provider level and then consider the more disaggregated project level.
Provider-Level Analysis
Data on the price of carbon offsets are available at the provider level, so it is natural to begin our analysis with models that seek to explain the price of carbon offsets as a function of general characteristics of the offset providers. We consider whether offset prices differ systematically based on where the provider is located and whether it has for-profit or not-for-profit status. We also investigate the effect on offset price of the number of projects under management, whether the projects are located in non-industrialized nations, whether projects are based on forest carbon sequestration (distinctions based on other project types are made in the next subsection), and whether projects are certified as valid under the Kyoto Protocol.
We estimate regression models with the general form
where P i is the price of carbon offsets per tonne of CO 2 e offered by provider i, location i is a categorical variable indicating the region where the provider is located (Australasia, North America, Europe), and nonprofit i is a dummy variable indicating not-for-profit status. The other variables characterize general features of the projects that each provider manages: numprojects i is the number of offset projects under management, nonindust i is the proportion of projects located in either developing or least-developed nations, forestry i is the proportion of projects with forestrybased carbon sequestration, and kyoto i is the proportion of projects that have CDM or GS certifi-cation. 7 Finally, ε i is an error term assumed to be normally distributed. We estimate linear and log-linear specifications using ordinary least squares (OLS). For reasons described below, we also estimate models in which the project-related variables are defined in an alternative way as dummy variables indicating, respectively, whether the provider manages more than one project, whether all projects are located in non-industrialized nations, whether all projects are forestrybased, and whether all projects qualify for inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol. Table 1 reports the results of all provider-level regression models. The linear and loglinear models in column (a) are the specifications with project-level variables as defined initially.
We find evidence that a provider's location does have an effect on the price it charges. Offset providers based in North America sell offsets at lower prices than those based in Europe. The difference is statistically significant and, according to the two models, suggests a price discount in North America of $6.91 on average, or a difference of 29 percent. We also find evidence, with statistical significance in the linear specification, that prices charged by providers located in Australasia are lower than those located in Europe. In this case, the difference is roughly $5.94, or 25 percent on average. There is no statistically significant difference between offset prices of providers located in North American and Australasia.
Another result with statistical significance relates to the effect of CDM or GS certification, which as described above, implies that a project meets certification standards and generates offsets that qualify for emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. Based on the linear model, the result is interpreted such that a 10-percent increase in the proportion of a provider's projects that are CDM-or GS-certified is associated with a $1.33 increase in the provider's price. It is important to note, however, that the comparison group here includes offset projects that may, or may not, have obtained some other certification; but in either case, the offsets would not qualify for emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. The corresponding result in the log-linear 7 We do not account for VCS certification in the provider-level analysis. The reason is that CC does not report a transparency measure for providers that includes VCS certification. We did, however, separately collect data from CC on VCS certification and include it in our subsequent project-level analysis.
model is that the same 10-percent increase in the proportion of certified projects is associated with a 5.9-percent increase in the provider's price.
All other coefficient estimates of interest are not statistically significant, though some attention to their signs is warranted, as it helps to motivate our subsequent project-level analysis.
Not-for-profit providers tend to have higher prices. Providers overseeing more projects tend to have lower prices. If a greater proportion of the projects are forestry-based, prices tend to be lower. Finally, the effect of a provider having a greater proportion of its projects in developing or least-developed nations has an unclear effect on price.
The models in column (b) differ because of variable definitions. As described above, we redefine numprojects i as a dummy variable indicating more than one project, and the variables nonindust i , forestry i , and kyoto i are indicators for whether 100 percent of the provider's projects satisfy the respective categorization. We estimate these models to test whether prices are different for the providers with more uniform criteria for their projects. The information presented for transparency on CC is also formatted in this way. When compared with the models in column (a), the results also provide a robustness check. In general, both sets of models produce very similar results in terms of the sign and statistical significance of coefficient estimates. The new specifications produce larger magnitudes on the provider location results, but none of the redefined variables comes through differently with statistical significance. The interpretation of the coefficient on kyoto i , however, has a sharper interpretation: providers that obtain CDM or GS certification for all their projects, compared to those that obtain it for some or none of their projects, set offset prices higher by $15.44. Based on the log-linear specification, this is an average mark-up of 65 percent.
Project-Level Analysis
The price of a carbon offset is determined at the provider level, but as we have seen, the majority of providers manage more than one offset project, with the average being 3.6. We now estimate hedonic price functions that take advantage of the more detailed data on individual offset projects.
We begin with estimation of regression models that have the general form The first set of models in column (a) of Table 2 includes only the categorical variables on offset type, with forestry projects as the omitted category. All coefficient estimates are positive, providing evidence that forestry-based offsets sell at lower prices. In both specifications, statistically significant coefficients are those on the project types of biomass methane, hydropower, solar, and wind. All four have magnitudes that are very similar and are not statistically different from one another. The general pattern in these models is that offsets of these four types, com-pared to those based on forestry, sell for higher prices between five and eight dollars more on average. The difference in price ranges between 40 and 50 percent.
The models in column (b) of Table 2 include the variables on the level of development in the nation where the offset project is located and the different types of third party certification.
When we include these additional variables, the results on differences between forestry and other offset types are weaker. While all coefficients remain positive, only the one for solar continues to have statistical significance, such that offsets from solar-power projects sell for an average premium, compared to those based on forestry, of $6.09 or 49 percent. We do find statistically significant differences between offset prices from projects in industrialized and non-industrialized nations. Those based in developing or least-developed nations sell for higher prices on average, between three and four dollars per tonne of CO 2 e, or roughly 20 percent. In these models, the differences between the prices in developing and least-developed countries are not statistically significant. Finally, the models show some differences in price as a result of third-party certifica- We now focus the analysis on forestry-based offsets. We do so because, as discussed previously, forestry-based offsets are very common and tend to be rather controversial. Furthermore, the results thus far suggest systematic differences in the price of forestry-based offsets. We report regression models in column (a) of Table 3 that are similar to those in column (b) of Table 2, but for the fact that we account for differences in the offset type with only a dummy variable for whether the project is forestry-based. While the estimated coefficient is negative, it is not statistically different from zero. The results for whether projects are located in developing or least- 
Discussion
We now broaden our discussion of the main empirical findings to explore possible explanations.
Before doing so, however, we acknowledge that interpretation of our results is susceptible to the classic identification problem that arises when estimating hedonic price functions (see Freeman   1993 ). In theory, each of the prices we observe for carbon offsets are consistent with the intersection of supply and demand, but the identification problem means that variability in prices cannot be definitively attributed to either shifts in demand or supply. In practice, this means that, for example, a variable associated with higher prices in the hedonic price function could be operating through an increase in costs (decrease in supply) or greater willingness to pay on the part of consumers (increase in demand). With this caution in mind, we turn to mechanisms that might explain the main results.
Among the more robust findings of our analysis is that the location of both providers and projects has a significant effect on offset prices. All providers included in the dataset are located in industrialized nations, but those located in Europe sell offsets for an average premium of nearly 30 percent. Many factors may be contributing to this price differential. Both awareness about climate change and agreement on the need to take action are perhaps greater in Europe than anywhere else in the world. Moreover, as discussed previously, GHG emissions are regulated throughout the European Union, and offsets are allowed as part of both industrial and national compliance strategies. Each of these factors, along with a potential preference for more regional offset providers, may contribute to an increase in demand, and therefore price, of carbon offsets sold by European providers.
Somewhat more surprising is the way that the location of projects themselves affects prices. When considering all types of offset projects, we find that projects occurring in developing and least-developing nations are significantly more expensive than those taking place in industrialized nations, by an average of nearly 20 percent. Assuming that these nations do not have the most current technology in place, one might expect the cost of emissions abatement in these nations to be lower than that in industrialized nations. This is, after all, the economic rationale for the Kyoto Protocol's CDM. But our empirical results, which show higher prices in nonindustrialized nations, are not consistent with this line of reasoning. One possible explanation for the price premium associated with offsets in non-industrialized nations is the desire for wealth redistribution, i.e., poverty alleviation, on the part of offset buyers in voluntary carbon markets.
The plausibility of this explanation is strengthened even further by the fact that in some specifi-cations, we also find significantly higher offset prices when projects are located in leastdeveloped nations compared to developing nations. It is also the case that establishing and managing offset projects in non-industrialized nations can have further challenges that increase the cost due to weaker institutional arrangements.
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Among all the types of offset projects considered in the dataset, forestry-based projects are the most common. It is also the case that forestry-based projects are the most controversial.
As discussed previously, concerns tend to focus in particular on whether projects that seek to avoid deforestation or promote reforestation are legitimately additional, permanent, or both. At the same time, forestry-based projects are frequently promoted because of associated co-benefits.
In addition to carbon sequestration, standing forests provide additional benefits in the form of wildlife habitat and ecosystem services more generally (Foley et al. 2005; Myers 1997 ). 11 We nevertheless find some evidence that forestry-based offsets sell for lower prices than offsets of other types, perhaps reflecting greater uncertainty about additionality and permanence. The stronger result, however, is that forestry-based offsets sell for substantially lower prices than offsets of other types when projects are located in non-industrialized nations, with average prices lower by 40 and 70 percent in developing and least-developed nations, respectively. With respect to uncertainty, these results may reflect how these nations often lack the institutions required to ensure the quality of forestry offsets, such as secure property rights, good governance, and monitoring infrastructure. Furthermore, lower prices in non-industrialized nations may be related to the lower opportunity costs of land in developing and least-developed nations when kept in for-ests. Distinguishing between these potential explanations for the lower price of forestry-based offsets in non-industrialized nations is critical, as there is significant international momentum to incorporate reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) offsets in the next round of climate negotiations, and these decisions will have important implications for both GHG emissions and land use in the future (see, for example, Miles and Kapos 2008) .
Demonstrating that offsets represent actual reductions in GHG emissions is essential for the long-term viability of offsets in both a regulatory and voluntary setting. In order to address the information asymmetry that exists between offset providers and buyers, emphasis is increasingly being placed on the importance of developing standards and establishing third-party certifiers to ensure the credibility of provider claims. Such certification might be expected to increase the price of offsets for reasons related to both supply and demand. Obtaining certification and/or complying with standards is not only costly; the additional information conveyed through certification might also increase a buyer's willingness to pay. Our results, however, suggest that the impact of certification on offset prices depends on the certifier.
A robust finding is that CDM or GS certification has a positive effect on offset prices, with estimates of the premium ranging between 30 and 65 percent. Whether this is driven by greater costs or greater willingness to pay is unclear, but a unique feature of these two certifications is that the offsets qualify for emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. This feature clearly has an additional benefit in a regulated setting, and to the extent that offsets with this certification are selling in the voluntary market, the premium indicates that offset buyers do in fact attach value to CDM and GS certification. We do not find a similar result for VCS certification.
In fact, we find some evidence that VCS certification, the largest non-regulatory certifier, is associated with lower offset prices, when compared to offset projects that are either uncertified or certified by some unspecified other third-party. We do not have a good explanation for this result, though it is consistent with simple descriptive statistics reported in Hamilton et al. (2009) , where prices are lower for VCS certified projects than for projects with other third-party certification or no certification. One potential explanation for the VCS discount is that VCS certification, compared to other certifications or no certification, may not allay concerns about additionality, permanence, and verifiability. Other possible explanations range from low costs of compliance with potentially weak VCS standards, an omitted variable in our analysis that is correlated with VCS certification and associated with lower prices, and the general possibility, discussed more below, that prices are not closely related to marginal costs because of a thin market.
Summary and Conclusion
The primary aim of this paper is to investigate factors that help explain the large variability in the price of voluntary carbon offsets. Using data listed on the Carbon Catalog (CC), we estimate hedonic price functions using a variety of provider-and project-level characteristics as explanatory variables. We find that providers located in Europe sell offsets at prices that are approximately 30 percent higher than providers located in either North American or Australasia. Contrary to what one might expect, offset prices are generally higher, by roughly 20 percent, when projects are located in developing or least-developed nations. But this result does not hold for forestry-based projects. We find evidence that forestry-based offsets sell at lower prices, and the result is particularly strong when projects are located in developing or least-developed nations. Offsets that are Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or Gold Standard (GS) certified, and therefore qualify under the Kyoto Protocol, sell at a premium of more than 30 percent, while third-party certification from the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS), one of the largest certifiers, is associated with a price discount. Variables that do not have a significant effect on offset prices are the number of projects that a provider manages and a provider's status as for-profit or not-for-profit.
We base our analysis on offset providers and projects listed on CC, which to our knowledge is the most comprehensive listing of sellers in the voluntary, over-the-counter offset market.
While the CC dataset continues to expand and others will surely emerge, future research should take advantage of greater sources of data. We expect that such centralized listings that increase transparency will also promote more competition in the offset market, the potential lack of which is a limitation of the analysis carried out here. Despite several robust findings, the market for carbon offsets is still relatively new, and one might reasonably question whether the market is thick enough for competitive pressures to be driving price differences. We also recognize, at least in the voluntary offset market, that the motives of buyers may range from a desire to alleviate personal guilt, to purchase so-called "charismatic carbon," to redistribute wealth, or to pursue strategies for corporate environmental management. Also at play are other important variables that we cannot measure directly, such as continuing concerns about additionality, permanence, and credibility. In conclusion, we emphasize that carbon offsets should be considered a bundle of characteristics well suited to hedonic analysis, and understanding what drives prices in this market is increasingly important. In this paper we have made a first attempt, one we hope spurs future research that keeps up with a growing market and takes advantage of expanded sources of data. Multiple projects is defined as the actual number of projects managed by the provider in column (a), while in column (b) the variable is a dummy for more than one project. Variables denoted with † are defined in column (a) as the percentage of the provider's projects that satisfy the criteria, while in column (b) the variables are defined as dummies indicating that all or none of the projects satisfy the criteria. Three, two, and one asterisk(s) indicate statistical significance at the 99-, 95-and 90-percent levels, respectively. 
